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I. Introduction
To date, most government efforts to promote distributed 
solar energy have involved incentivizing property owners to 
undertake voluntary installations. However, that approach 
is changing, as government actors move to increase distrib-
uted solar generation capacity not only through incentive 
programs, but also through requirements. Such a change 
from voluntary to mandatory measures represents a seismic 
shift in the approach to encouraging distributed solar gen-
eration, and it may raise objections about interference with 
property expectations.
The Comment addresses those concerns by exploring 
the nature of property expectations in the energy con-
text and analyzing how courts and legislatures have bal-
anced property expectations against past government 
measures to encourage energy production and devel-
opment of underexploited resources. The Comment 
concludes that throughout the history of energy devel-
opment in the United States, property owners’ expec-
tations have been understood to accommodate socially 
beneficial energy production, and that the concerns sur-
rounding the promotion of distributed solar generation 
counsel a similar approach.
II. Promoting Distributed Solar 
Installation
Distributed solar generation, such as solar installations on 
residential or commercial rooftops, represents an energy 
resource with great potential. Using largely unharnessed 
areas of already developed properties for on-site energy 
generation presents overlapping benefits, such as increased 
clean energy production without additional energy sprawl 
or transmission concerns.1 Moreover, if many distributed 
solar energy sources are aggregated, that can lead to a sub-
stantial cumulative societal benefit.
Aggregating distributed solar sources, however, is 
an inherent challenge to maximizing their benefit. To 
reach the full potential of this energy source, both in 
terms of production capacity and in terms of network 
or microgrid efficiencies,2 requires mass participation. 
Quite simply, the more distributed generators there are, 
the greater the impact of distributed generation. But 
because distributed power sources are, almost by defi-
nition, located across multiple properties with multiple 
owners, the installation of mass-distributed generation 
capacity requires the coordinated activity of multiple 
private actors, which can be difficult.
As a relatively new energy technology, distributed solar 
installation has had some success, but it still faces the chal-
lenges that many new technologies face in achieving broad 
acceptance. Some property owners are uncertain about 
adopting the technology, due to concerns over reliability, 
uncertainty about benefits relative to costs, or even cog-
nitive barriers that prevent rational investment.3 Further, 
the lack of adoption may be self-perpetuating, with some 
property owners waiting for widespread acceptance before 
investing themselves, while others await the price drop that 
will likely accompany increased production of solar panels. 
Finally, others may simply not wish to invest at all, per-
haps because they believe that rooftop solar installations 
are not aesthetically pleasing or because they are unlikely 
to directly realize the benefits.4 Whatever the cause, wide-
spread adoption of distributed solar generation has not yet 
been realized, and the full potential of the resource has 
been hampered by the assembly problems frequently asso-
1. See generally Michael Pappas, Energy Versus Property, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
435, 439-41 (discussing benefits of distributed generation) [hereinafter Pap-
pas, Energy].
2. See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl With Microgrids, 43 Conn. 
L. Rev. 547, 559 (2010) (discussing microgrids and their benefits).
3. See Pappas, Energy, supra note 1, at 441-43.
4. See, e.g., id. at 442 (“Landlords often have no incentive to invest in energy 
efficiency or renewable energy because the tenant pays the utility bill.”).
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ciated with attempts to coordinate the actions of multiple 
individual parties.5
Recognizing these assembly problems, some state 
and local governments have undertaken efforts to speed 
the adoption of distributed solar generation by offering 
incentive programs such as subsidies or tax breaks.6 Some 
states have even counted distributed solar generation 
toward utilities’ Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 
requirements.7 Consistently, these efforts to promote 
distributed solar generation have involved measures to 
encourage voluntary adoption. The policies incentiv-
ize solar installation, but they do not require it,8 leaving 
individual property owners to decide for themselves and 
thus doing relatively little to alleviate the assembly prob-
lems in achieving mass adoption.
The voluntariness approach is changing, however, with 
some jurisdictions going beyond incentives for voluntary 
installation and instead seeking to achieve widespread 
distributed solar generation through mandates. A num-
ber of recent codes and ordinances in California illustrate 
the rise of such requirements for distributed solar instal-
lation. First, California’s statewide building code includes 
the 2013 California Building Energy Efficiency Standards, 
which became effective July 1, 2014.9 Section 110.10 of 
the Standards provides “mandatory requirements for solar-
ready buildings,” including requirements for “solar-ready” 
rooftops that “make[ ] space available” for “easier installa-
tion” of solar cells.10
Second, in March 2013, the city of Lancaster, located 
about 70 miles north of Los Angeles, became the “first U.S. 
city to require solar [installations]” on all new homes.11 
5. For a fuller discussion of assembly problems, see, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill 
& Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 39 (2d ed. 2012).
6. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables or Efficiency 
(DSIRE), http://www.dsireusa.org (aggregating information on state 
incentive programs).
7. See California Renewable Portfolio Standard Eligibility Guidebook 7 (2010) 
(discussing credit available for distributed generation, and noting that fur-
ther guidance will be available in the future), available at http://www.en-
ergy.ca.gov/2010publications/CEC-300-2010-007/CEC-300-2010-007-
CMF.PDF.
8. Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) impose mandatory requirements 
on investor-owned utilities, electric service providers, or aggregators. (For 
more information on California measures, visit the California Public Utili-
ties Commission web page, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renew-
ables/.) While such RPSs essentially create or enhance a market for renew-
ables production, they do not actually require the production of renewables 
on the individual level. Thus, any individual producer of renewable energy 
still has the option to choose whether or not to produce renewable energy.
9. 2013 California Building Energy Efficiency Standards, available at http://
www.energy.ca.gov/2012publications/CEC-400-2012-004/CEC-400-2012- 
004-CMF-REV2.pdf.
10. For a more detailed discussion of these standards, see Pappas, Energy, supra 
note 1, at 444.
11. For more information, visit Lancaster, California’s, website, http://www.
cityoflancasterca.org/index.aspx?page=1279 (with links available to up-
dated city zoning ordinance as well as “residential solar initiative”); see 
also Herman K. Trabish, -BODBTUFS $" #FDPNFT 'JSTU 64 $JUZ UP 3FRVJSF
Enacting solar requirements through its zoning ordinance, 
the city requires an average of one kilowatt of solar pro-
duction per residential home, either through on-site pro-
duction or through purchase of credits from other solar 
installations in the city.12
Finally, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a 
resolution entitled Solar Vision 2020, which “requires solar 
installation on all new construction or substantial retrofits 
in the City,”13 though the resolution, which has the force 
of an ordinance, tempers its requirements by mandating 
solar installation only “where feasible.”14 It was enacted in 
November 2014, but as of this writing, the implementa-
tion details were still being developed by San Francisco’s 
Department of the Environment, consistent with the reso-
lution’s language.15
Taken together, the California measures demonstrate a 
trend toward promotion of distributed solar installations 
through mandates, rather than merely through property 
owners’ voluntary action or incentives.
III. Tension With Private-Property 
Expectations
The California examples, as well as any other mandates 
for installation of distributed solar technologies such as 
solar hot water systems in Hawaii and Puerto Rico,16 rep-
resent a new governmental push toward mass-distributed 
solar development and an important step toward over-
coming assembly problems. But they also raise questions 
about how these requirements impact individual property 
rights. Individual autonomy, particularly reflected through 
a right to exclude persons from and control uses of one’s 
own property, is thought to be a core element of private 
Solar, GreenTech Media, Mar. 27, 2013, at http://www.greentechme-
dia.com/articles/read/Lancaster-CA-Becomes-First-US-City-to-Require-
Solar. See also Felicity Barringer, 8JUI )FMQ 'SPN /BUVSF B 5PXO "JNT
to Be a Solar Capital, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2013, at http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/04/09/us/lancaster-calif-focuses-on-becoming-solar-capital-of-
universe.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1.
12. See City of Lancaster, 4QSFBEJOH4VOTIJOF"MM0WFSUIF1MBDF, Residential 
Solar Initiative, http://www.cityoflancasterca.org/index.aspx?page=1279.
13. The resolution is available at the San Francisco Board of Supervisors website, 
http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/resolutions14/r0406-14.
pdf.
14. Id. (“The Board of Supervisors support[s] the requirement of solar in-
stallations and/or rooftop gardens on all new construction or substantial 
retrofits in San Francisco where feasible, and urges the Department of the 
Environment to convene stakeholders to propose how this requirement 
be implemented.”).
15. Id.
16. See Haw. Rev. Stat. §196-6.5 (“Solar water heater system required for 
new single-family residential construction”); U.S. Department of Energy, 
Puerto Rico Building Energy Code With Mandatory Solar Hot Water Heating, 
http://energy.gov/savings/puerto-rico-building-energy-code-mandatory-
solar-water-heating. See also Pappas, Energy, supra note 1, at 485 (discuss-
ing other mandates).
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property.17 Measures mandating installation of solar tech-
nologies limit owners’ abilities to exclude or control uses, 
and thus revisit a core tension found in property law: bal-
ancing strong individual autonomy principles18 with more 
societally focused goals and values.19 As a result, mandates 
may raise strong feelings and significant objections about 
infringement on private-property rights.
Reducing conceptual concerns with property rights to 
the most concrete claim that may arise, property owners 
who object to mandatory rooftop solar installations may 
claim that such requirements amount to a taking of their 
property, evoking the canonical Loretto decision estab-
lishing that a regulation compelling physical invasion 
of property is a per se taking under the Fifth Amend-
ment.20 In Loretto, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
New York City ordinance requiring property owners to 
allow cable boxes on their roofs constituted a compen-
sable taking of property because the regulation required 
a third-party physical invasion and thus a curtailment of 
the “right to exclude” that is central to private property. 
Property owners upset with required solar installations 
might claim that mandatory solar panels on a rooftop 
present a strikingly similar fact pattern and represent the 
same invasion of the right to exclude. Thus, such property 
owners may argue that mandatory solar rooftop installa-
tions constitute a per se taking of property rights and 
require compensation.
In response to such claims, states and municipalities 
could engage in case-by-case defenses, highlighting specific 
factual differences to distinguish their distributed genera-
tion requirements from the situation at issue in Loretto.21 
While arguments based on distinguishing the facts may 
be convincing and may ultimately prevail, it is not certain 
ex ante that a court would accept such lines of distinction; 
accordingly, the risk of potential Takings Clause liability 
may chill governments from adopting requirements for 
distributed generation. To supplement factual arguments 
distinguishing Loretto, the next section offers a broader 
context for understanding how such mandates fit with 
property expectations, particularly when understood in 
light of past government efforts to promote similar devel-
opment of important resources.
17. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 16.
18. William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries 1 (characterizing property as “that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe.”).
19. See, e.g., David Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 Theoret-
ical Inquiries L. 103, 104-05, nn.2-3 (2009) (describing juxtaposition of 
Blackstonian view with more “community-oriented property law” theories).
20. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
21. The Loretto opinion specifically noted that a per se taking would not arise 
from “the State’s power to require .  .  . compl[iance] with building codes 
and provi[sion of ] utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire ex-
tinguishers, and the like.” Id. at 440. Government actors could argue that 
distributed generation requirements are similar to such building codes or 
utility connections and thus do not create per se takings liability.
IV. Property Expectations in Context
Government efforts to promote the development of energy 
resources date back to the earliest fuel sources, and many 
of these efforts imposed limitations on private-property 
owners’ rights to exclude and their general autonomy. For 
centuries, courts and legislatures have been forced to bal-
ance private-property expectations against the needs of 
energy development, and consistently the result has been 
that private-property protections must yield to important 
resource needs.
For example, as discussed below, measures to promote 
production of energy resources across property lines have 
curtailed property owners’ rights to exclude, and courts 
have upheld the measures and found no takings liabil-
ity. Additionally, anti-waste measures have limited the 
autonomy of private-property owners and steered prop-
erty uses to promote the development of underutilized 
resources; there, too, courts have held that the measures 
are valid and noncompensable. This section examines both 
types of measures limiting property expectations in favor 
of resource development, and applies them to the context 
of mandatory solar installation, ultimately finding that the 
same underlying justifications also apply in the distributed 
solar context.
A. Energy Development and the Right to Exclude
Throughout the nation’s history, courts and legislatures 
have promoted energy development through measures that 
have limited property owners’ rights to exclude.22 This has 
particularly been the case when the establishment, devel-
opment, or expansion of an energy resource has required 
overcoming assembly problems and linking or spanning 
multiple different properties. Two specific examples are the 
Mill Acts, which promoted early hydropower development; 
and forced pooling and unitization laws, which aided in oil 
and gas extraction.
Throughout the 1800s, legislative passage and judicial 
application of Mill Acts demonstrated how American 
property law was seen to prioritize energy production and 
development over landowners’ rights to exclude.23 The 
laws encouraged the development of water mills, which 
harnessed kinetic hydropower generated by water continu-
ously flowing from dam-controlled reservoirs. Building 
reservoirs to establish or expand water mills frequently 
caused flooding of neighboring lands, leading to property 
claims that threatened to curtail water mill development.24
To resolve disputes and allow continued expansion of 
hydropower sources, state legislatures passed Mill Acts 
limiting potential causes of action and remedies for the 
flooding. For example, the acts disallowed neighbors from 
bringing trespass actions and thus foreclosed the oppor-
22. See generally Pappas, Energy, supra note 1.
23. Id. at 460.
24. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-
1860, at 47 (1977).
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tunity for neighbors to enjoin the flooding; moreover, the 
acts even allowed mill owners to escape liability altogether 
by showing that, on balance, the mill benefitted the com-
plaining neighbor.25 In essence, these acts restricted neigh-
boring property owners’ rights to exclude the impacts of 
water mill development. In upholding the Mill Acts against 
challenges, courts stressed that, at the margins, a property 
owner’s right to exclude must yield to the important social 
necessity of energy development.26
Modern courts have employed similar reasoning in 
upholding measures that limit the right to exclude to pro-
mote development of oil and gas resources. For example, 
through forced pooling and unitization statutes, state legis-
latures have required neighboring landowners whose prop-
erty overlies continuous oil or gas reservoirs to join together 
in extracting hydrocarbon energy resources through coop-
erative wells.27 Even though the landowners have different 
property tracts, each with its own surface boundaries as 
well as its own rights to withdraw oil and gas, these statutes 
force cooperation to promote more efficient and complete 
access to the oil and gas resources.28
Such acts serve not only to force recalcitrant land-
owners to extract energy resources when they otherwise 
would not do so, but also to require unwilling landown-
ers to accommodate third-party physical invasion, such as 
trucks, pipelines, and wells, of the surface and subsurface 
of their properties.29 Despite these significant compro-
mises of the right to exclude, the laws have been uniformly 
upheld and found to trigger no compensation liability for 
Takings Clause challenges, all based on the reasoning that 
the right to exclude can be constitutionally limited for the 
25. Id. at 48; Pappas, Energy, supra note 1, at 460.
26. See, e.g., Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (1 Pick.) 68, 70-71 
(1831), noting that the Mill Acts were:
designed to provide for the most useful and beneficial occupation 
and enjoyment of natural streams and water-courses, where the ab-
solute right of each proprietor, to use his own land and water privi-
leges, at his own pleasure, cannot be fully enjoyed, and one must of 
necessity, in some degree, yield to the other.
27. See Pappas, Energy, supra note 1, at 465-74.
28. See generally 1 Bruce M. Kramer & Patrick R. Martin, The Law of 
Pooling and Unitization §6.02 (3d ed. 1989). For representative com-
pulsory unitization statutes, see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. §§15-72-308 to 15-
72-315; Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§3640 et seq.; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§55-1301 
et seq.; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §30:5; Miss. Code Ann. §53-3-7; N.M. Stat. 
Ann. §§70-7-1 et seq.; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, §§287.1 et seq.; and Wyo. 
Stat. §30-5-110.
29. For example, New Mexico recognizes rights of well operators to enter and 
use the surface or land within a force-unitized area even when not part of 
the operator’s lease, and even though the same entry onto non-unitized 
land would constitute trespass. Kysar v. Amoco Prod. Co., 93 P.3d 1272, 
1282 (N.M. 2004). See also Continental Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559 
N.W.2d 841 (N.D. 1997)) (holding that even though a force-pooled tract 
suffered a subsurface physical invasion, the invasion did not amount to 
trespass or a compensable claim because the forced pooling statute su-
perseded such property law principles). See also Pappas, Energy, supra 
note 1, at 469-72. $G Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 
268 S.W.3d 1, 11-17 (Tex. 2008) (holding that a hydraulic fracturing 
operation that crossed property lines two miles below the surface, injected 
materials under the neighbor’s lands, and withdrew gas from under the 
neighbor’s land created no actionable trespass absent injury to the surface 
of the land).
purpose of conserving and utilizing publicly beneficial 
energy resources.30
B. Anti-Waste Measures and Autonomy
In addition to limiting property owners’ rights to exclude, 
laws have also limited landowners’ autonomy regarding 
the use of resources through “anti-waste” measures.31 
Such laws have particularly been applied to spur the 
development of underused or developing resource bases 
that have not been tapped to their full societal potential. 
The purpose of such legal measures is to eliminate waste-
ful underuse by requiring that certain resources be more 
effectively harnessed.
Much of the history of American water law reflects such 
a concern with eliminating wasteful underuse of water 
resources, and the development of water law regimes reflects 
a shifting of property expectations to allow and encourage 
resource use. For example, the development of American 
water law from the English natural-flow doctrine to the 
doctrine of reasonable-use riparian rights represented a 
legal transition that curtailed the property expectations of 
downstream landowners in order to encourage expanded 
use and withdrawal of water resources that were perceived 
as underutilized.32
Under the original English system, property owners 
along a watercourse had an expectation in the undimin-
ished flow of water past the property; as a result, a down-
stream landowner could assert a property right to prevent 
an upstream owner from withdrawing water. Because 
this system limited water use and led to perceived waste-
ful underuse of water, American states altered property 
expectations to embrace the riparian rights system, which 
allowed all owners of land abutting or containing a water-
course (that is, “riparian” land) to make reasonable use of 
water, even if that use involved a withdrawal that dimin-
ished the flow.33
The riparian rights doctrine worked in the eastern states, 
but when it proved insufficient for development in the arid 
western states, the rise of the prior appropriations doc-
trine demonstrated another shift in property expectations 
to prevent resource underuse.34 Since riparian land was 
30. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1900) (em-
phasizing that a state’s police power allowed it to prevent the waste of 
energy resources and allowed state legislatures to define property rights 
not to include wasteful extraction of the resources); Champlin Refining 
Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 233-34 (1932); 
Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 P.2d 997, 1004-05 
(Okla. 1951) (upholding compulsory unitization statutes); Patterson v. 
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83, 95 (Okla. 1938) (upholding com-
pulsory pooling statutes).
31. See Michael Pappas, "OUJ8BTUF, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 741, 771-78 (2014).
32. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 132-33 (Ark. 1955) (discuss-
ing the nature of the natural-flow doctrine and the riparian reasonable-use 
doctrine, and rejecting the natural-flow approach in favor of a riparian rea-
sonable-use regime in order to promote “the benefits accruing to society in 
general from a maximum utilization of our water resources.”).
33. Id.; see also Pappas, "OUJ8BTUF, supra note 31, at 776-77.
34. See, e.g., In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of All the 
Water, 2002 MT 216, ¶ 9, 311 Mont. 327, 332, 55 P.3d 396, 399 (Mont. 
2002):
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relatively scarce in the West, the riparian rights doctrine, 
which limited water rights to use on riparian tracts, led to 
underuse of water and impediments to land development.35 
The prior appropriation doctrine sought to eliminate this 
underuse by decoupling water rights from the ownership 
of riparian land and instead grounding water rights in the 
diversion and beneficial use of water.36 Further, the prior 
appropriations doctrine defined it as “wasteful” to allow 
water to flow by unused,37 further encouraging the use 
of water and premising the continued existence of water 
rights on continued beneficial use of the water.38 As this 
history reflects, each of these transitions in the develop-
ment of American water law involved altering a property 
expectation to correct a perceived underuse of a resource, 
thereby prioritizing resource development over previously 
held autonomy interests.
Similarly, the development of the adverse possession 
doctrine, particularly as applied to wild lands, represents 
a legal measure designed to combat perceived underuse of 
Miners in California developed a water use system as an alternative 
to the riparian water system prevalent in England and the eastern 
United States. While riparians allowed owners of land abutting the 
water source to control it, the more arid climes of the American 
West required a different approach. Prior appropriation, adapting 
flexibly to the needs of a developing society, allowed diversion to a 
distant location and simply required use of the water for a beneficial 
purpose. Western states adopted the miners’ customs through both 
court decisions and codification, and the doctrine of prior appro-
priation became the law of the western states.
 (citing A. Stone, Selected Aspects of Montana Water Law 7 (1978); 
Christine A. Klein, ǲF$POTUJUVUJPOBM.ZUIPMPHZPG8FTUFSO8BUFS-BX, 14 
Va. Envtl. L.J. 343, 347-48 (1995)). See also Charles F. Wilkinson, 
Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of the 
West 231-35 (1992).
35. See In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water, 
supra note 34, 55 P.3d at 399.
36. Id.:
The common law elements of a valid appropriation are intent, 
notice, diversion and application to beneficial use. However, in 
Montana, as in many western states, the flexibility of the prior 
appropriation doctrine has allowed acquisition of the right to use 
a specific amount of water through application of the water to a 
beneficial use.
37. See, e.g., Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah 1991) (noting 
that western states are “vitally interested in seeing that none of the [state’s] 
waters are allowed to run to waste or go without being applied to a beneficial 
use”) (citing Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, 239 P. 479, 481 (Utah 
1925)). See also 2 Cal. Jur. 3d Water §33 (2005) (“The policy of the state 
courts may be summarized to be that the rivers and streams of the state 
that waste into the sea should, if possible, be conserved for beneficial uses.”) 
(emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 27 F. Supp. 2d 
1230, 1243 (D. Nev. 1998) (“Under the established tenet that a beneficial 
use is the measure and limit of a water right, when the necessity for the 
use of the water ceases to exist or is reduced, the extent of the water right 
is limited to the extent of the beneficial purpose which remains.”); Smith 
v. Hawkins, 120 Cal. 86, 52 P. 139, 140 (1898) (“If plaintiffs could forfeit 
their entire right of appropriation by nonuser, equally will they be held to 
forfeit less than the whole by like failure.”); State v. Hagerman Water Right 
Owners, Inc., 947 P.2d 400, 407-08 (Idaho 1997) (holding that partial for-
feiture is available in Idaho and that a contrary holding would be inconsis-
tent with the principle of beneficial use); In re Musselshell River Drainage 
Area, 255 Mont. 43, 840 P.2d 577, 579 (1992) (“The controlling principle 
upon which water ‘rights’ in Montana are perfected and continue to possess 
legal validity is that of beneficial use; water rights cease when the water is 
no longer applied to a beneficial use.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
In re Birdwood Irrigation Dist., 154 Neb. 52, 46 N.W.2d 884, 888 (1951) 
(“We conclude that the power to cancel the whole of an appropriation for 
irrigation purposes for nonuser carries with it the right to cancel a part.”).
resources, even at the expense of sacrificing autonomy.39 
The adverse possession doctrine transfers property title 
from a landowner to an adverse possessor if the adverse 
possessor demonstrates sufficient use of the land.40 In the 
case of wild lands, courts have shown a particular willing-
ness to transfer “unexploited” lands to an adverse-possess-
ing party that has taken measures to develop them.41 By 
setting a relatively low bar for transferring title from “idle” 
landowners, who left their property in a wild state, to 
“industrious” adverse possessors, who made developmen-
tal use of the land, the doctrine reflected an attempt to 
remedy a perceived underdevelopment of productive land 
resources.42 The doctrine poses serious challenges to a land-
owner’s autonomy to control the use of property and even 
institutes a no-liability rule for transferring the title of the 
property, but it has nonetheless been upheld and justified 
on the basis of spurring beneficial development of an unde-
rutilized resource base.43
C. Exclusion, Autonomy, and Solar Mandates
As the previous sections discuss, when conflicts have 
arisen between property expectations on the one hand, 
and measures to develop energy sources or tap underuti-
lized resources on the other, courts and legislatures have 
emphasized that property expectations must yield to the 
socially important energy or underutilization concerns. 
Similar energy development and underutilization concerns 
animate measures requiring rooftop solar panels, and thus 
the same reasoning justifies preempting property owners’ 
expectations of exclusion or autonomy.
The Mill Acts and forced pooling and unitization mea-
sures were necessary to promote energy development in the 
face of assembly problems,44 and distributed solar genera-
tion faces the same challenges. To reach its potential as an 
energy source, distributed generation requires sufficient 
installed capacity across multiple property tracts; to build 
39. See Pappas, "OUJ8BTUF, supra note 31, at 773-74.
40. See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, "O&OWJSPONFOUBM$SJUJRVFPG"EWFSTF1PTTFT-
sion, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 816, 824 (1994) (“The successful adverse pos-
sessor must hold actual, hostile, exclusive and continuous possession of land 
in an open and notorious manner under a claim of right or color of title for 
a requisite period.”).
41. Id. at 828-29:
Almost all states allow adverse possession of wild lands based on ac-
tivities which are inferior in quality and duration to those required 
for developed lands. In some states this rule is express: the adverse 
possessor of lands which are characterized as “wild,” “outlying and 
uncultivated,” unsuited for “any useful permanent improvement” 
or “undeveloped,” need only perform the activities which are suited 
or adapted to the land in its natural condition. In most states, the 
rule is implicit: the adverse possessor must use the land in the same 
manner that a reasonable owner would, in light of its nature, char-
acter and location.
42. Id. at 821; see also id. at 826 (“Most modern adverse possession decisions 
involve claims to either tracts of wild land or disputed border strips in de-
veloped areas.”).
43. See, e.g., Pappas, "OUJ8BTUF, supra note 31, at 774.
44. See, e.g., Kramer & Martin, supra note 28, at §1.02 (“The history of oil 
and gas development in the United States leads to the inevitable conclusion 
that the legal, economic, and engineering worlds have never reached a level 
of coordination that would allow for the efficient and equitable development 
of oil and gas reservoirs without substantial governmental intervention.”).
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this critical mass of energy production requires avoiding 
assembly problems and securing the cooperation of numer-
ous individual property owners. Just as measures curtailing 
the right to exclude were necessary to force cooperation 
across property boundaries in the cases of hydropower 
development and oil and gas extraction, so some compro-
mise of the right to exclude may be justified in the case of 
distributed solar generation.
Moreover, just as anti-waste measures limited the 
autonomy of individual property owners in order to pro-
mote development of underused resources, mandates for 
solar energy installation seek to tap the underutilized 
capacity of rooftops to generate energy. In the same way 
that allowing water to flow by without using it was once 
considered waste, now the untapped energy potential of 
sunlight hitting roofs can also be seen as waste, and gov-
ernment actors may be justified in taking measures to har-
ness the untapped potential, even if doing so imposes some 
limits on landowner autonomy. The same challenges that 
confronted past resource development now confront the 
expansion of distributed solar installations, and the same 
justifications for limiting property expectations to accom-
modate development of these energy sources are once 
again applicable.
V. Conclusion
Efforts to promote distributed solar generation through 
mandates may represent a new direction in the policy to 
expand renewable energy capacity, but the approach is not 
so novel when considered in light of past energy-promotion 
and anti-waste measures. Past experiences provide context 
for understanding the balance between property expecta-
tions and new requirements for rooftop solar generation, 
and they should offer insight for both planners and prop-
erty owners when considering whether renewable energy 
mandates run afoul of property rights. As discussed, there 
is a long and consistent history of property expectations 
yielding to concerns about energy resource development 
and underuse, and with this history in mind, the advent 
of mandatory distributed solar appears not to be such a 
seismic shift after all.
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